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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-3649 
 ___________ 
 
 VICTOR MANUEL URQUIAGA, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A31-333-522) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2010 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







 Victor Manuel Urquiaga, a native and citizen of Peru who became a permanent 
resident of the United States in 1974, applied for admission to this country as a returning 
permanent resident in 2005.  The Government charged him as removable for having been 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, citing his 1988 conviction for sexual 
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assault and his 1993 conviction for criminal sexual contact.  Urquiaga conceded the 
charge, and sought waiver of admissibility under former INA § 212(c) (former 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(c)).  Weighing the evidence gathered after a hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
denied the application for relief from removal.  Urquiaga appealed the decision to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal on October 31, 2008. 
 On January 7, 2009, Urquiaga filed a motion before the BIA captioned a “motion 
to reopen.”  In the body of his motion, he also described the motion as a motion to 
reopen; in his conclusion, however, he called the motion a motion to reconsider.  In the 
short motion, he reviewed the facts of his case, and submitted that he merited a favorable 
exercise of discretion and the grant of Section 212(c) relief.  He also argued that the BIA 
had erred in focusing on his past convictions and perceived lack of rehabilitation in 
upholding the denial of relief.  The BIA denied the motion to reopen because Urquiaga 
offered no evidence in support of his motion or in support of his prima facie eligibility 
for a waiver of inadmissibility.  The BIA also stated that if Urquiaga was seeking 
reconsideration, his motion was untimely.  Urquiaga submits a petition for review.   
 We have jurisdiction to review an order denying reopening or reconsideration 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  However, because Urquiaga is removable for having 
committed a crime of moral turpitude, our jurisdiction is circumscribed; in addition to 
considering our own jurisdiction, we can review only constitutional claims and questions 
of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D); McAllister v. Attorney Gen. of the United 
States, 444 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2006); Jarbough v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 
483 F.3d 184, 188 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007).   
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 Upon review, we will deny the petition for review.  Urquiaga argues that the BIA 
abused its discretion and denied his right to due process by denying his motion to 
reconsider as untimely.  More specifically, he states that he was entitled to equitable 
tolling in order to avoid the miscarriage of justice of allowing the BIA’s earlier decision 
to stand.  He also contends that the BIA committed error by denying the motion to 
reconsider without addressing any of his substantive arguments.          
 We note first what Urquiaga does not challenge – the denial of his motion as a 
motion to reopen.  Because he did not raise this issue in his brief, it is waived, and we do 
not consider it.  See F.D.I.C. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2000).     
 Urquiaga also does not contest that his motion as a motion to reconsider was filed 
after the statutory deadline.  A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the 
entry of the relevant BIA decision.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(b).  In this case, the BIA 
entered the relevant decision on October 31, 2008.  Urquiaga did not file his motion until 
more than 30 days later, on January 7, 2009.  Although Urquiaga now requests equitable 
tolling, he did not ask the BIA to grant him such relief.  We cannot consider an issue he 
did not raise in the agency.  See Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2005).   
We note nonetheless that despite claiming a “miscarriage of justice” on the grounds that 
the BIA erred in finding that he was not entitled to relief, Urquiaga does not provide a 
basis for equitable tolling in any event.  In short, because Urquiaga filed his motion after 
the statutory deadline, the BIA committed no error in denying it as an untimely motion 
without reviewing Urquiaga’s substantive arguments. 
 We conclude that Urquiaga’s claims of due process violations are without merit.  
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In denying the motion as untimely, the BIA did not violate Urquiaga’s right to due 
process.  “The enforcement of procedural deadlines does not violate due process.”  Dakaj 
v. Holder, 580 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2009).  Furthermore, the record simply does not 
support a claim that Urquiaga was in any way deprived of a fundamentally fair hearing; 
he had an ample opportunity to be heard.   
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
